O'Brien (Respondent) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Appellant) (HTML version), (2005)
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O'Brien (Respondent) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Appellant) (HTML version), (2005)
HOUSE OF LORDSSESSION 2004-05[2005] UKHL 26on appeal from: [2003] EWCA Civ 1085OPINIONSOF THE LORDS OF APPEALFOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSEO'Brien (Respondent)v.Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Appellant)ONTHURSDAY 28 APRIL 2005The Appellate Committee comprised:Lord Bingham of CornhillLord SteynLord Phillips of Worth MatraversLord Rodger of EarlsferryLord CarswellHOUSE OF LORDSOPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENTIN THE CAUSEO'Brien (Respondent) v. Chief Constable of South Wales Police (Appellant)[2005] UKHL 26LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILLMy Lords,1. I have had the advantage of reading in draft the opinions of my noble and learned friends Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Carswell, with which I am in complete agreement. For the reasons they give, I also would dismiss this appeal.2. As the number of reported cases on the topic makes clear, similar fact evidence has proved a contentious and uncertain area of the law, particularly in criminal cases but also in civil cases like that before the House. But such evidence may be very important, even decisive. It is undesirable that the subject should be shrouded in mystery.3. Any evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant. Contested trials last long enough as it is without spending time on evidence which is irrelevant and cannot affect the outcome. Relevance must, and can only, be judged by reference to the issue which the court (whether judge or jury) is called upon to decide. As Lord Simon of Glaisdale observed in Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, 756, "Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof .. relevant (ie. logically probative or disprobative) evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires proof more or less probable".4. That evidence of what happened on an earlier occasion may make the occurrence of what happened on the occasion in question more or less probable can scarcely be denied. If an accident investigator, an insurance assessor, a doctor or a consulting engineer were called in to ascertain the cause of a disputed recent event, any of them would, as a matter of course, enquire into the background history so far as it appeared to be relevant. And if those engaged in the recent event had in the past been involved in events of an apparently similar character, attention would be paid to those earlier events as perhaps throwing light on and helping to explain the event which is the subject of the current enquiry. To regard evidence of such earlier events as potentially probative is a process of thought which an entirely rational, objective and fair-minded person might, depending on the facts, follow. If such a person would, or might, attach importance to evidence such as this, it would require good reasons to deny a judicial decision-maker the opportunity to consider it. For while there is a need for some special rules to protect the integrity of judicial decision-making on matters of fact, such as the burden and standard of proof, it is on the whole undesirable that the process of judicial decision-making on issues of fact should diverge more than it need from the process followed by rational, objective and fair-minded people called upon to decide questions of fact in other contexts where reaching the right answer matters. Thus in a civil case such as this the question...See the full content of this document
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