Austin (FC) (Appellant) & another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent), (2009)
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Austin (FC) (Appellant) & another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent), (2009)
HOUSE OF LORDSSESSION 2008-09[2009] UKHL 5 on appeal from: [2007] EWCA Civ 989 OPINIONSOF THE LORDS OF APPEALFOR JUDGMENT IN THE CAUSEAustin (FC) (Appellant) & another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent)Appellate CommitteeLord Hope of CraigheadLord Scott of FoscoteLord Walker of GestingthorpeLord CarswellLord Neuberger of AbbotsburyCounselAppellant:Heather Williams QCPhillippa Kaufmann(Instructed by Christian Khan Solicitors )Respondent:Lord Pannick QCJohn Beggs(Instructed by Directorate of Legal ServicesMetropolitan Police Service )Hearing dates :24 and 25 NOVEMBER 2008ONWEDNESDAY 28 JANUARY 2009HOUSE OF LORDSOPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENTIN THE CAUSEAustin (FC) (Appellant) & another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent)[2009] UKHL 5LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEADMy Lords,1. One of the features of a vigorous and healthy democracy is that people are allowed to go out onto the streets and demonstrate. Thousands of demonstrations take place each year in London. Experience has shown that for the most part gatherings of this kind are peaceful. The police, on whom the responsibility of maintaining public order rests, seek to facilitate rather than impede their activities. Unfortunately, human nature being what it is, this is not always possible. Sometimes an event attracts people who do not share the peaceful intentions of the organisers. Sometimes it is the organisers themselves whose intentions are anything but peaceful. On those occasions it may be necessary for the police to take control of the event to ensure public safety and minimise the risk of damage to property. The event with which this case is concerned was such an occasion. 2. The ways in which the police will seek to control the event will vary from case to case. In this case their policy was one of containment. Its consequence was that a large number of people were enclosed in the place where they had gathered within a police cordon. They were prevented for many hours from leaving it. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the cases which that article specifies. The appellant was one of those within the police cordon. The question which this case raises is whether the way in which she was treated was incompatible with her Convention right to liberty. Underlying that question is an important issue of principle. The right which is guaranteed by article 5(1) is an absolute right. But it must first be held to be applicable. To what extent, if at all, is it permissible in the determination of that issue to balance the interests of the individual against the demands of the general interest of the community? The appellant submits that it is plain that she was deprived of her right to liberty. She says that the reason why the cordon was put in place and kept there for so long is irrelevant. If she is right, she must succeed in this appeal. If she is wrong, the judges findings are against her. They show conclusively that the sole purpose of the cordon was to maintain public order, that it was proportionate to that need and that those within the cordon were not deprived of their freedom of movement arbitrarily. ...See the full content of this document
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